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Dancing Around Miranda: The Effects of
Legal Reform on Homicide Detectives in
the USA and the UK
Fiona Brookman, Sophie Pike, & Edward R. Maguire*
ABSTRACT
Drawing upon qualitative data gathered during fieldwork at
homicide units in the USA and UK, this paper explores how detec-
tives in both settings have responded to legal reforms intended to
protect suspects’ rights. Our analyses reveal that homicide detec-
tives in the USA routinely engage in procedures intended to
circumvent these rights, typically to enhance the likelihood of elicit-
ing a confession. We explore, in particular, the tactics adopted by
detectives in the USA to circumvent suspects’ Miranda rights im-
mediately prior to and during the interrogation of homicide suspects.
We discuss how and why detectives in the USA and UK, two nations
with “adversarial” legal systems, appear to have responded differ-
ently to legal reforms designed to enhance suspects’ rights during
interviews and interrogations (Miranda in 1966 and the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act of 1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
In both the UK1 and the USA, suspects are afforded certain rights
when questioned by police. These rights have developed over time
in both countries and are currently rooted in two sources of author-
ity, one legislative and the other judicial. In England and Wales, the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) was introduced in 1984 in
an effort to balance the rights of suspects with the powers of the
*Fiona Brookman is a professor of criminology at the University of South
Wales. She earned her Ph.D. in criminology from Cardiff University. Her research
focuses on homicide, violence, and major crime investigation.
Sophie Pike is a lecturer in criminology at Bath Spa University in England.
She earned her Ph.D. in criminology from the University of South Wales. She
specializes in the study of homicide and criminal investigation.
Edward R. Maguire is a professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal
Justice at Arizona State University. He earned his Ph.D. in criminal justice from the
University at Albany, SUNY. His research focuses primarily on policing and violence.
1There are three criminal justice jurisdictions in the United Kingdom: England
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. This paper uses data only from the first
and largest of these jurisdictions—England and Wales. However, for ease of read-
ing, we refer to the UK throughout this paper unless it is essential to distinguish
regions.
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police. The legislation was enacted following widespread concerns
about police practices when suspects were in custody, including dur-
ing interviews. Of note, numerous cases during the 1970s and 1980s
placed attention squarely on the “investigative and specifically the
interview process as a major contributor to miscarriages of justice in
the UK.”2 In the USA, the Miranda v. Arizona ruling of 1966 followed
similar concerns about police interrogation practices. In particular, it
was hoped that the Miranda warnings would reduce the risk of
coercion.3 In a similar vein to PACE, Miranda affords suspects certain
rights on arrest and during police interrogation. Despite their similar
objectives, it appears that these respective legal mechanisms have
been reacted to in rather distinct ways by homicide detectives in the
UK and USA.
Drawing upon qualitative data gathered during fieldwork at
homicide units in the UK and USA, we illustrate how British and U.S.
detectives have responded in different ways to the emergence of
PACE and Miranda. We suggest that some of these differences are
cultural (e.g. different emphases on the value of confessional
evidence and the “skill” of outsmarting suspects) whilst others relate
to the different practices that have emerged—most notably in the
UK—around professionalizing homicide investigations. We then
move on to explore in detail the ways in which homicide detectives
in the USA circumvent Miranda and we compare these practices to
those adopted by British homicide detectives during suspect
interviews. Practices surrounding the detention and interrogation of
homicide suspects are important to understand for a number of
reasons. In many countries homicide investigations are considered
to represent the “gold standard” of criminal investigations. Police
departments often invest substantial portions of their resources to
the investigation of these grave crimes. Therefore, we might reason-
ably expect these kinds of investigations to adhere most closely to
legal and procedural rules or guidance and to avoid flaws and errors.
The ramifications of flawed homicide investigations are significant
for many reasons, including the possibility of committing two serious
errors of justice: imposing a potential life or death sentence on an in-
nocent person, or failing to capture a guilty person and therefore
potentially endangering the public.4 For these and other reasons, the
public has high expectations that the police will carry out homicide
2Sam Poyser & Becky Milne, Miscarriages of Justice: A Call for Continued
Research Focussing on Reforming the Investigative Process, 13 BRITISH J. FORENSIC
PRAC. 61, 63 (2011).
3Linda M. Keller, Alternatives to Miranda: Preventing Coerced Confessions via
the Convention Against Torture, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 745 (2007).
4Peter Stelfox, The Evolution of Homicide Investigation in the UK, 10 J.
HOMICIDE & MAJOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 92 (2015); BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE:
NATURE, SOURCES AND REMEDIES (2004).
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investigations competently, professionally, and quickly. In Part II, we
review the literature on the emergence of Miranda and PACE and
the extent to which these legal reforms have afforded suspects
enhanced rights. We also review the small body of research that has
specifically explored how detectives in the USA bypass Miranda,
how and why police “bend” rules, and how courts in the United
States have seemingly diluted Miranda since its inception. In Part III,
we describe the methodology we used in our analyses. In Part IV,
we present the findings from our interviews and observations in the
UK and the USA. Finally, in Part V we offer some concluding
thoughts on homicide investigation, custodial interrogation, and dif-
ferences in the effects of legal reforms in the UK and the USA.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Miranda v. Arizona
Efforts to professionalize police interrogation practices in the USA
began in the 1930s in a bid to reduce or eradicate the use of coercive
or “third degree” methods of interrogation.5 This continued in the
1960s when interrogation manuals were published and a psychologi-
cal approach began to underpin interrogations,6 the most well-known
being Reid and Inbau’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.7
However, it was the 1966 ruling in Miranda v. Arizona that prompted
fundamental changes in the way police interrogated suspects.8 The
decision was actually based on four cases in which confessions
were obtained in breach of the suspects’ constitutional rights, but it
was Ernesto Miranda’s confession that was used to justify the ruling.9
Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in this case,
5
“Third degree” methods “ranged from psychological coercion to outright
torture.” Brooks Holland, Miranda v. Arizona: 50 Years of Regulating Police Inter-
rogation, 16 INSIGHTS ON LAW & SOCIETY 4, 6 (2015). The publication of the
Wickersham Commission Report “Lawlessness in Law Enforcement” in the 1930s
prompted reform. See UNITED STATES NAT. COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT,
NO. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931); see also RICHARD A. LEO,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 63 (2008).
6Saul M. Kassin, Sara C. Appleby, & Jennifer Torkildson Perillo, Interviewing
suspects: Practice, Science, and Future Directions, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.
39 (2010).
7FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962).
The latest edition of the book, written with additional co-authors, was published in
2013. See FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH J. BUCKLEY, & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed., Jones & Bartlett 2013).
8Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10
A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); see also Roscoe C. Howard & Lisa A. Rich, A History of
Miranda and Why It Remains Vital Today, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 685 (2006).
9Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436; see also Howard & Rich, supra note 8, at 690.
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Miranda v. Arizona became the “most famous case in the history of
United States criminal procedure.”10
Ernesto Miranda was arrested in Arizona for the kidnap and rape
of a woman.11 He was identified by the victim and subsequently
interrogated by police.12 During the interrogation, Miranda confessed
and was later convicted.13 Miranda appealed his conviction on the
basis that he had not been informed of his right to speak to a lawyer
or told that a lawyer may be present during the interrogation, nor
had he been informed of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.14 In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in his favor.15
Miranda’s conviction was overturned and the Supreme Court
established what became known as the Miranda “rights” or
“warnings.”16
The Miranda warnings, which must be relayed to a suspect before
any custodial interrogation, are as follows:
A. You have the right to remain silent.
B. If you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can
be used against you in a court of law.
C. You have the right to consult with an attorney, and to have the
attorney present during interrogation.
D. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to
represent you.17
The Supreme Court did not stipulate the precise language that
should be used when issuing the Miranda warning, indicating only
the content that must be addressed.18 When suspects “waive” their
rights, detectives must be able to demonstrate that they did so know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently before the interrogation may begin.
10Tammy R. Pettinato, The Custody Catch-22: Post-Interrogation Release as a
Factor in Determining Miranda Custody, 65 ARK. L. REV. 799, 801 (2012).
11Miranda, 384 U.S. at 518.
12Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491; Howard & Rich, supra note 8, at 691.
13Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491; Howard & Rich, supra note 8, at 691.
14Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491; Howard & Rich, supra note 8, at 691.
15Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492–93; Bryan Taylor, You Have the Right to Be
Confused. Understanding Miranda After 50 Years, 36 PACE L. REV. 160 (2015).
16Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–73. Miranda was later retried for the crime. See
Paul G. Ulrich, Miranda v. Arizona: History, Memories, and Perspectives, 7 PHOENIX
L. REV. 203, 251–54. During this second trial, his common-law wife testified that he
had confessed to her and, based on her incriminating testimony, Miranda was found
guilty of the rape a second time. Ulrich, supra note 16, at 254.
17Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–73.
18Richard Rogers, Chelsea E. Fiduccia, Eric Y. Drogin, Jennifer A. Steadham,
& John W. Clark, General Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are
Effective Miranda Advisements Still Necessary?, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432,
433 (2013).
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As criminologist and confessions expert Richard Leo explains: “if
detectives fail either to properly warn suspects of their Miranda
rights or to elicit a proper waiver, any statements the suspect makes
should, in theory, be excluded from evidence at trial.”19 The introduc-
tion of the Miranda rights was intended to protect suspects from
coercive interrogation practices and prevent against false
confessions.
B. Miranda Warnings and Police Interrogation
Although only a small number of experts have examined how the
Miranda warnings are delivered,20 some research conducted in the
United States has explored how police try to bypass and minimize
its importance to suspects during interviews. For example, Leo’s
extensive research includes direct observations of more than 100
police interrogations and considers a number of issues, including the
various tactics that the police use to persuade suspects to waive
their Miranda Rights in order to proceed with an interrogation.21 Leo
and White identified three particular ways in which the warnings are
delivered.22
Firstly, the Miranda warnings are merely read out, before suspects
are asked if they understand them and if they choose to waive them;
in doing so, investigators act “merely as conveyors of legal informa-
tion, delivering the warnings in a way that appears non-partisan.”23
Secondly, and most commonly, they are delivered in such a way as
to diminish their importance, beginning with “rapport-building small
talk” as the police aim to portray themselves as a friend before
broaching the subject of rights.24 The warnings are then depicted as
an “unimportant bureaucratic ritual,” which police fully expect the
suspect to waive so that the interrogation can proceed.25 Leo adds
that in these circumstances, the detectives become less animated
as they convey the warnings and will also try and blend them into
19Leo, supra note 5, at 123.
20Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1293
(2017).
21Leo, supra note 5, passim.
22Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interroga-
tors’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV.
397 (1999). Leo and White’s findings are based on earlier data collected by Leo
and Ofshe. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Decision to Falsely
Confess: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 979 (1997).
They accumulated over 125 transcripts of disputed interrogations and other case
materials between 1987 and 1997 from various jurisdictions, which included major
felony and murder cases.
23Leo & White, supra note 22, at 432.
24Leo & White, supra note 22, at 433.
25Leo & White, supra note 22, at 433.
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the conversation.26 Perhaps the clearest indication of the extent to
which the importance of the warnings is downplayed is the reference
that the police often make to television or films through which the
suspect may have heard of Miranda.27 Indeed, the presence of the
Miranda warnings in popular culture is seen to normalize this
formality.28 However, research has shown that the general public’s
understanding of Miranda is, in reality, minimal at best.29
The third method of delivery involves the detective advising the
suspect that waiving the Miranda rights will be beneficial, although
these benefits are often “implicit rather than explicit.”30 Nevertheless,
the authors cite a case in which a homicide suspect was told that if
he gave his side of the story, he would be viewed more favorably
and receive a lighter sentence.31 Finally, if the police are unsuccess-
ful in their efforts to obtain a waiver, it is not necessarily the end of
their efforts to circumvent Miranda. When suspects invoke their
rights, the police might give them some time to think about it in the
hope that they will reconsider. Police might also try to persuade
them to change their mind, or continue to question a suspect in
violation of Miranda.32 Alternatively, investigators may fully disregard
the requirements of Miranda and ask suspects to sign the waiver
without reading them their rights, indicating that the suspect has no
choice but to sign the waiver form.33 Leo concludes that all of these
tactics persist and that Miranda has become merely a “manageable
annoyance” for investigators.34
Similar findings were identified by Feld35 in a study which he
described as only the second “naturalistic empirical study of police
26Leo, supra note 5, at 127–28; see also Leo & White, supra note 22, at 433–
44.
27Leo & White supra note 22, at 433–35.
28Anthony J. Domanico, Michael D. Cicchini, & Lawrence T. White, Overcom-
ing Miranda: A Content Analysis of the Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations, 49
IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2012); Richard Rogers, Allyson J. Sharf, John W. Clark, Eric Y.
Drogin, Darby B. Winningham & Margot M. Williams, One American Perspective on
the Rights of Accused: An Initial Survey of Miranda Rights in a Broader Context, 34
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 477 (2016).
29Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2016); Laura Smalarz,
Kyle C. Scherr, & Saul M. Kassin, Corrigendum: Miranda at 50: A Psychological
Analysis, 26 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 455 (2017).
30Smalarz et al., supra note 29, at 440.
31Smalarz, et al., supra note 29, at 433.
32Smalarz, et al., supra note 29, at 433.
33Leo, supra note 5, at 123–24.
34Leo, supra note 5, at 124.
35Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops
Question Kids, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2013).
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interrogation in the United States in the past three decades,” the first
being the research carried out by Leo.36 Focusing on juveniles
charged with a felony, Feld looked at 307 cases in which suspects
had invoked or waived their Miranda rights, examining case files and
conducting interviews with professionals including police, prosecu-
tors and defense lawyers. Feld found that the importance of the
warnings was downplayed and that suspects were told that it was
their only opportunity to recount their story.37 Before the warnings
were given, suspects were asked generic questions, which helped
the police to build rapport with the suspect and therefore lead them
towards waiving their rights.38 Weisselberg noted that the courts ap-
pear to have sanctioned conversations that might take place before
a waiver is obtained, though this only appears to be the case if the
police do not ask incriminating questions.39
Domanico and colleagues examined twenty-nine electronically
recorded custodial interrogations taken from a pool of felony murder
or Class A, B and C felony cases in Milwaukee and found that the
police minimized the importance of Miranda in 45% of the
interrogations.40 They also found that the Miranda warnings were
often portrayed as something to “get out of the way.”41 In addition,
they found that the police would speak more quickly when relaying
the warnings and that suspects needed the reading ability of a
fifteen- to sixteen-year-old to understand the waiver.42 Furthermore,
93% of the suspects waived their rights,43 a finding supported by Leo
who also acknowledged the success of the police in obtaining
waivers.44 Finally, Blackwood and colleagues evaluated the Miranda
waiver decisions of eighty pre-trial defendants from two jails in
Oklahoma; they found that almost half of the defendants failed to
36Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room”]; Richard A. Leo, Miran-
da’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259
(1996) [hereinafter, “Leo, Miranda’s Revenge”].
37Feld, supra note 35, at 10–11.
38Feld, supra note 35, at 10.
39Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519 (2008).
40Domanico et al., supra note 28, at 15–16.
41Domanico et al., supra note 28, at 15–16.
42Domanico et al., supra note 28, at 14–15.
43Domanico et al., supra note 28, at 13–14.
44Leo, supra note 5, at 123–32.
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consider the long-term consequences of waiving their Miranda
rights.45
The small amount of research on Miranda waivers that has been
conducted in the USA indicates that police are adept at circumvent-
ing Miranda to their advantage. Specifically, mounting evidence sug-
gests that police are successful in securing waivers and inducing
suspects to talk. The interesting question that follows is why the
police might engage in such practices. In order to address this is-
sue, we turn to the broader literature on rule breaking by police.
C. Rule Breaking by Police
Rule breaking by police has been explored by a number of
scholars. Innes introduced the concept of “compliance drift” as a
means to understand the initial genesis of rule breaking during
criminal investigations.46 “Compliance drift” occurs when individuals
who are working on protracted cases and under considerable pres-
sure, begin to deviate from standard working practices.47 Innes states
that there are several causes of compliance drift, but that all es-
sentially result from detectives’ perceived need to “maintain the
investigative system’s efficacy when it is under strain.”48 Conse-
quently, detectives bypass procedure and regulation to reduce strain
and such actions eventually become part of accepted practice, not
least because they are seen to have been successful at reducing
strain and resolving problems in the past.49
Ericson describes two ways in which the police deal with rules:
the “ways and means act” and “the end justifies the means.”50 In the
former, rules are considered an obstacle to effective criminal
investigation and so they are “ignored, sidestepped or subject to
interpretive leaps.”51 “The end justifies the means” refers to the view
that efficient criminal investigation is in the public’s interest and
“trumps due process.”52
Loyens undertook ethnographic research with two police teams in
45Hayley L. Blackwood, Richard Rogers, Jennifer A. Steadham, & Chelsea E.
Fiduccia, Investigating Miranda Waiver Decisions: An Examination of the Rational
Consequences, INT’L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 11, 42–43 (2015).
46MARTIN INNES, INVESTIGATING MURDER. DETECTIVE WORK AND THE POLICE RESPONSE TO
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 242, 259–63, 265, 275 (2003).
47INNES, supra note 46, at 242, 259–63, 265, 275.
48INNES, supra note 46, at 259.
49INNES, supra note 46, at 259–63.
50Richard V. Ericson, Rules in Policing: Five Perspectives, 11 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 367, 370 (2007).
51Ericson, supra note 50, at 370.
52Ericson, supra note 50, at 370.
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Belgium.53 She found that many detectives were inclined to bend the
rules, that rule breaking was not limited to a few “bad apples” and
that rule bending generally occurred in situations where rule abid-
ance could “jeopardize values like effectiveness or efficiency.”54
Forst proposed a sophisticated way of identifying and managing
errors of justice that draws on the framework commonly used to
manage errors in statistical inference.55 He argued that such a
framework should be used for managing errors that arise within the
criminal justice system, particularly since these errors result in such
profound costs to society.56 In statistical inference, a Type I error is a
false positive and a Type II error is a false negative.57 Similarly, Forst
describes two types of errors of justice: errors of due process58 and
errors of impunity.59 Errors of due process, like Type I errors, are
false positives; they involve subjecting innocent people to the weight
of the legal process, whether through harassment, detention, or
sanctioning.60 They can arise from a range of causes, from honest
mistakes at one end of the scale, to corruption at the other.61 Errors
of impunity, like Type II errors, are false negatives; they involve the
failure to sanction those responsible for an offence.62 Errors of
impunity can be the consequence of skillful offenders avoiding detec-
tion or poor policing.63 Forst considers the costs that both types of
errors of justice impose upon society, notably that they “shake the
foundations of public confidence in institutions broadly regarded not
long ago as trustworthy, if not sacred, built on sworn oaths to uphold
the law.”64
Of particular relevance to our paper is Forst’s view that law
enforcement is “the engine of errors of justice.”65 For Forst, the likeli-
hood of errors of justice increases as the pressure to solve crime
53Kim Loyens, Rule Bending by Morally Disengaged Detectives: An Ethnographic
Study, 15 POLICE PRAC. & RES., AN INT’L J. 62 (2014).
54Loyens, supra note 53, at 72.
55BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES AND REMEDIES (2004).
56FORST, supra note 55, passim.
57FORST, supra note 55, at 34–36.
58FORST, supra note 55, at 10–21.
59FORST, supra note 55, at 22–30.
60FORST, supra note 55, at 10–21.
61FORST, supra note 55, at 10–21.
62FORST, supra note 55, at 22–30.
63FORST, supra note 55, at 22–30.
64FORST, supra note 55, at 2.
65FORST, supra note 55, at 109.
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grows and police find ways to successfully resolve cases.66 In
particular, Forst argues that the “case for managing errors of justice
is most strikingly made for the crime of homicide.”67 He suggests
that opportunities for of justice in homicide investigation are plentiful
and can arise at any point in the process, from the very beginning
when the police must determine whether or not a homicide has oc-
curred, to identifying a suspect, to determining the appropriate
charges (e.g. establishing whether the charge ought to be first or
second degree murder or manslaughter).68
Forst goes on to argue that whilst it is possible to identify where
failings lie when guilty offenders are not brought to justice (i.e. errors
of due process), errors of impunity are less well understood due to
the lack of “any systematic attempt by the police to document known
errors in detaining and arresting suspects.”69 Forst proffers that the
most significant source of errors of justice is the use of incentives,
which place the police under pressure to resolve high-profile cases
and can lead to the “use of untrustworthy snitches, overlooking (and
occasionally suppressing) exonerating evidence, inducements to
false confessions, and shopping for laboratory technicians who are
more inclined to find incriminating evidence against the suspect.”70
In 2015, fifty-eight homicide defendants were exonerated in the
United States; five of whom had been sentenced to death.71 Of the
fifty-eight exonerees, twenty-two (38%) falsely confessed and forty-
four (76%) were wrongly convicted because of official misconduct,
including by the police.72 Forst argues that changes to policies that
contribute excessively to errors of justice will help avoid their occur-
rence in the future, suggesting that improvements could be made to
witness identification procedures and accountability in criminal
investigations.73
The ways in which detectives have circumnavigated Miranda is
one part of a larger story of how suspects’ rights have been
diminished. We turn now to a consideration of some key court rul-
ings that appear to have diluted the potency of Miranda since its
inception. Arguably, such rulings have sent a message to police that
66FORST, supra note 55, at 66–111.
67FORST, supra note 55, at 184.
68FORST, supra note 55, at 184–211.
69FORST, supra note 55, at 19.
70FORST, supra note 55, at 199.
71Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations in 2015 (Feb. 3, 2016), at 4,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_
2015.pdf [hereinafter “2015 Exonerations”].
722015 Exonerations, supra note 71, at 7.
73FORST, supra note 55, at 211.
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it is permissible to “push back” against legal reforms governing
criminal investigation practices.
D. Diluting Miranda
According to Romano, since its beginning, “Miranda has sustained
subtle setbacks and restrictions to provide police with more leeway
in seeking confessions and avoiding the suppression of evidence.”74
A series of rulings in response to particular criminal cases have,
arguably, begun to dilute the protective powers of Miranda.
To illustrate, Van Chester Thompkins was arrested on suspicion of
murder following a shooting in Michigan.75 Although police read him
his rights, Thompkins refused to sign them and during interrogation
he remained silent for almost three hours.76 Police asked Thompkins
if he had prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting to which he
responded “yes.” Although he would not write his confession, his
response to that question formed the basis of his eventual
conviction.77 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected Thompkins’
argument that his having remained silent constituted an invocation
of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.78 Relying on the
Court’s prior decision in Davis v. United States, which held that
suspects must invoke their rights clearly and unambiguously,79 the
majority concluded that Thompkins’ silence failed to constitute such
a clear and unambiguous invocation.80
There is good reason to require an accused who wants to invoke his
or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously. A requirement of
an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective
inquiry that avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to officers
on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity. If an ambiguous act, omis-
sion, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police
would be required to make difficult decisions about an accused’s
unclear intent and face the consequence of suppression if they guess
wrong . . .
Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did
not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple,
unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off
74Illan M. Romano, Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court
Loosens Miranda’s Grip in Favor of Law Enforcement, 35 NOVA L. REV. 525, 527
(2011).
75Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 374, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L. Ed. 2d
1098 (2010).
76Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 375.
77Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 376–78; see also Romano, supra note 74, at 527.
78Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 380–82; Romano, supra note 74, at 527.
79Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).
80Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381–82; see also Michael O’Neil, The Unjust Applica-
tion of Miranda: Berghuis v. Thompkins and Its Inequitable Effects on Minority
Populations, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 85 (2011).
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questioning . . . Here he did neither, so he did not invoke his right to
remain silent.81
Although Miranda requires police to show that suspects have
waived their rights knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently,82 both the
dissenting justices and subsequent commentators argued that the
Court’s ruling in Berghuis v. Thompkins places responsibility on
suspects to know how to invoke their rights.83
A number of researchers have noted that the ruling in Berghuis v.
Thompkins will have negative impacts for certain kinds of suspects.
For example O’Neil argues that the ruling will prove especially
damaging to individuals from minority populations as these individu-
als are more likely to use indirect language and be less assertive,
making it challenging for them to clearly and unambiguously invoke
their rights.84
Salseda and colleagues explored the connection between the
deficits present in those suffering ASD [autism spectrum disorders]
and a potential lack of comprehension of Miranda among these
individuals.85 They suggested that ASD sufferers are more likely to
waive their rights because of impairments in social cognition, adding
that variations in how Miranda warnings are delivered compounds
these difficulties.86 Other researchers have noted that one need not
suffer from any kind of impairment to fall foul of safeguarding
measures once suspected of a crime. For example, Dearborn notes
that the majority of suspects do not understand their Miranda rights
and are not therefore in a position to waive them without the advice
81Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381–82 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
82Leo, supra note 5, at 123.
83Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 391, 407–12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Romano,
supra note 74, at 546. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Thompkins argued that the
majority decision meant “a suspect who wishes to guard his right to remain silent
against . . . a finding of ‘waiver’ must, counterintuitively, speak—and must do so
with sufficient precision to satisfy a clear-statement rule that construes ambiguity in
favor of the police.” Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 391. She went on to say, “What in the
world must an individual do to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent
beyond actually, in fact, remaining silent?” 560 U.S. at 409. Her critique of the
majority’s logic led some commentators to conclude that the words used in Miranda
warnings are fatally outdated since “telling a suspect that he has the right to remain
silent is no longer accurate.” Michael D. Cicchini, The New Miranda Warning, 65 S.
METHODIST U.L. REV. 911, 918 (2012).
84O’Neil, supra note 80, at 100–01.
85Lindsay M. Salseda, Dennis R. Dixon, Tracy Fass, Deborah S. Miora, &
Robert A. Leark, An Evaluation of “Miranda” Rights and Interrogation in Autism
Spectrum Disorders, 5 RES. IN AUTISM & SPECTRUM DISORDERS 79 (2011).
86Salseda et al., supra note 85, at 82–84; see also Domanico et al., supra note
28; Richard Rogers, Kimberly S. Harrison, Daniel W. Shuman, Kenneth W. Sewell,
& Lisa L. Hazlewood, An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehen-
sion and Coverage, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 177 (2007).
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of a lawyer.87 This lack of understanding is heightened when the
suspect is “simultaneously faced with a barrage of psychological
trickery and manipulation.”88 Smalarz and colleagues state that,
“once under suspicion, and targeted for interrogation, even well-
adjusted, intelligent adults are at risk despite Miranda.”89
A second case illustrative of the dilution of Miranda is Florida v.
Powell in 2010.90 Powell was arrested for the illegal possession of a
handgun and subsequently read his Miranda rights.91 However, he
appealed his subsequent conviction on the basis that the Miranda
warning he was given did not clearly inform him of his right to have
an attorney present during interrogation by the police.92 The Florida
Supreme Court agreed with Powell, finding that the warning
intimated only that he had the right to speak to a lawyer before be-
ing questioned.93 However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
warnings he had received were sufficient because they “reasonably
conveyed” his rights under Miranda.94 Romano argues that this
signaled a substantial move away from the original Miranda ruling,
as it was the first time that a court approved a warning that saw a
key aspect, the right to have an attorney present during interroga-
tion, essentially entirely disregarded.95
Some research suggests that police will employ tactics to avoid
ever having to inform suspects of their rights, an approach that
some commentators say has been supported by court rulings
subsequent to Miranda. The Miranda ruling provides that the warn-
ings only need to be administered to an individual prior to a custodial
interrogation.96 However, Leo found that the police would question
suspects in a non-custodial setting in order to circumvent this legal
87Christopher D. Dearborn, You Have the Right to an Attorney, but Not Right
Now: Combating Miranda’s Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under
Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 359
(2011).
88Dearborn, supra note 87, at 373.
89Smalarz et al., supra note 29, at 458.
90Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2010).
91Powell, 559 U.S. at 53–54.
92Powell, 559 U.S. at 54.
93State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 2008).
94Powell, 559 U.S. at 62.
95Romano, supra note 74, at 532.
96Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10
A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
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necessity.97 Further, Maoz notes that in post-Miranda rulings, the
Court has “made room for tactics to flourish by allowing officers to
easily manipulate the distinction between custodial and non-custodial
interrogations.”98
The evidence presented here suggests that Miranda has not fully
protected individuals from “inherently coercive” police interrogations
and that suspects remain vulnerable to these practices.99 Given the
numbers of suspects in the USA who have confessed to crimes for
which they have later been exonerated, the consequences of
coercive practices are clearly significant.100
Concerns around police interrogations are not restricted to
investigations in the USA. Suspects’ rights in the UK have faced
similar criticism, leading to the introduction of the landmark Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and other measures such
as the development of the PEACE model of interviewing.101 Unlike in
the USA, these measures appear to have resolved earlier disquiet
around suspects’ rights and interviewing practices.
E. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984
PACE aimed to balance the rights of the suspect with the powers
of the police. It “defined police powers, laid down investigative
procedures and defined suspects and others’ rights.”102 The legisla-
tion moved to address the lack of guidance for police work and the
subsequent “variation in practice and many gaps in the legal defini-
tions of what was, and was not, permissible.”103 Furthermore, PACE
increased police accountability by ensuring that decisions are
recorded at the time they are made, making failure to adhere to the
Act a disciplinary offence, and introducing complaints procedures.104
PACE is supplemented by eight “Codes of Practice” lettered A to
97Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police
Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME, L., & SOC. CHANGE: AN INT’L J. 35, 43 (1992).
98Aurora Maoz, Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial Settings,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1322 (2012).
99Smalarz, et al., supra note 29, at 455.
100James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010); Jacobi, supra note 29, at 9–23.
101PEACE is an acronym that stands for: Planning and preparation; Engage
and explain; Account, clarify and challenge; Closure; and Evaluation. See TONY
COOK & ANDY TATTERSALL, BLACKSTONE’S SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS’ HANDBOOK (2d ed.
2010).
102PETER STELFOX, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
34 (2009).
103STELFOX, supra note 102, at 68.
104Tim Newburn & Robert Reiner, Policing and the Police, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 910 (4th ed. Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan, & Robert
Reiner eds., 2007).
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H, each focusing on a particular aspect of criminal investigation
process.105 Code C focuses on the detention, treatment and question-
ing of suspects, as historically “police cells and interview rooms
were secretive, dark corners of criminal process that were in practice
almost impervious to external scrutiny.”106 PACE also saw the
introduction of a custody officer responsible for ensuring that the
police adhere to the Codes of Practice.107 Additionally, under PACE
all police interviews now require audio, and in some cases visual,
recording as outlined in codes E and F, to resolve allegations of
“verballing,” whereby false or incriminating statements were errone-
ously attributed to suspects.108
PACE radically altered the ways in which suspect interviews in
England and Wales were conducted, however, it has not been
exempt from criticism. Research has shown that fewer than half of
those held by police receive legal advice and the independence of
the custody officer role has been questioned.109 Mylonaki and Burton
have argued that PACE is dependent upon the police regulating
themselves and that, despite new time limits for detention in custody,
there is evidence to suggest that requests for extensions are rarely
denied.110 Critics suggest that the process does not always balance
the rights of suspects with the powers of the police in the manner
that was intended.111 Finally, PACE has been subject to numerous
amendments, indicative of ongoing concerns.
Nevertheless, the evidence tends to signify a general acceptance
of PACE by police in the UK. In their research exploring what
constitutes “success” in homicide investigations in England and
Wales, Brookman and Innes identified the importance of “procedural
success” to the detectives that they interviewed and observed.112
They found that conducting a proper investigation that complied with
105Northern Ireland Dep’t of Just., PACE Codes of Practice, https://www.justice-
ni.gov.uk/articles/pace-codes-practice (last visited July 27, 2019).
106Paul Roberts, Law and Criminal Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TION 113 (Tim Newburn et al. eds, 2007).
107Home Office, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Code C
Revised. Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons
by Police Officers (Feb. 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/592547/pace-code-c-2017.pdf.
108Roberts, supra note 79, at 92.
109Roberts, supra note 79, at 92.
110Emmanouela Mylonaki & Tim Burton, A Critique of the Deficiencies in the
Regulation of Contemporary Police Powers of Detention and Questioning in England
and Wales, 83 POLICE J. 61 (2010).
111ANDREW SANDERS & RICHARD YOUNG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed., 2007).
112Fiona Brookman & Martin Innes, The Problem of Success: What is a “Good”
Homicide Investigation?, 23 POLICING & SOC’Y: AN INT’L J. RES. & POL’Y 292, 300
(2013).
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official guidance was a key objective and that “the “gold standard” of
homicide investigations was as much, if not more, about maintaining
the integrity of the investigation than it was about identifying
offenders.”113 Moreover, known breaches of PACE have been widely
condemned. To illustrate, during the search for a missing young
woman, Sian O’Callaghan, in 2011, the Senior Investigating Officer
(SIO), Steve Fulcher, sanctioned an “urgent interview” of the suspect,
Christopher Halliwell, that was conducted by the arresting officers.114
However, when Halliwell did not speak, Fulcher took the decision to
continue the “urgent interview” himself.115 Fulcher questioned Hal-
liwell who then led police to Sian O’Callaghan’s body, as well as that
of Becky Godden-Edwards, whom he had murdered eight years
earlier.116 Later, Halliwell’s lawyers argued that the detective’s ac-
tions were “an assault on the integrity of the legal system” as Hal-
liwell was neither cautioned nor given access to a solicitor.117 Agree-
ing, the judge ruled that the evidence pertaining to Halliwell’s
confessions was inadmissible.118 Although the police had sufficient
additional evidence in the case of Sian O’Callaghan’s murder, this
was not so for Becky Godden-Edwards. As a result, Christopher
Halliwell was charged with only one murder.119 In short, whilst some
commentators have raised concerns regarding the efficacy of PACE,
this case clearly illustrates that the legislation has been firmly upheld
when breached.120
Whilst PACE broadly legislates for the detention and questioning
of suspects, the introduction of the PEACE model of interviewing in
the 1990s served to further professionalize the interview process.121
In part, this expansion of professionalization emerged in response to
113Brookman & Innes, supra note 112, at 300.
114Joshua Rozenburg, Ignoring PACE Was Not “Brave,” LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE, Oct.
24, 2012, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/ignoring-pace-was-not-brave/
67944.article.
115Rozenburg, supra note 114.
116Paul Peachey, Inside Story: How a Resourceful Detective Got Chris Halliwell
to Confess- But Fell Foul of the Law, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 20, 2012, http://www.indepen
dent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/inside-story-how-a-resourceful-detective-got-chris-halliwel
l-to-confess—but-fell-foul-of-the-law-8218762.html; Rozenburg, supra note 114.
117Peachey, supra note 116.
118Peachey, supra note 116.
119Martin Evans, Sian O’Callaghan Killer Escapes Justice for Second Murder
After Police Blunder, THE TELEGRAPH, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/crime/9619952/Sian-OCallaghan-killer-escapes-justice-for-second-murder-a
fter-police-blunder.html. In 2016, however, Christopher Halliwell was convicted of
Becky Gooden-Edwards’ murder after the discovery of new evidence led to a new
trial.
120Mylonaki & Burton, supra note 110, at 72–76.
121See COOK & TATTERSALL, supra note 101, at 310.
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evidence that PACE had not resolved all of the problems it was
intended to fix, and, in fact, PACE prompted renewed interest by
researchers into police interviewing practices.”122 For example,
Moston and colleagues found that many police considered securing
a confession to be the main aim of a suspect interview.123 Similarly,
Dixon describes how the oppressive interviewing of “The Cardiff
Three”124 suspects exemplified the need for a new approach to
interviewing.125 The PEACE framework of interviewing aimed to ad-
dress the shortcoming with suspect interviews that persisted despite
PACE.126 Symbolic of this change, came a shift in terminology127 from
interrogation to investigative interviewing and the adoption of fresh
psychological principles of interviewing.128 PEACE provides a
“chronology of events for the interview process” and stands for:
Planning and preparation; Engage and explain; Account, clarify and
challenge; Closure; and Evaluation.129 A five-tier model of interview-
ing was also introduced, with tier-three designed to ensure that
those involved in the investigation of serious offences have the
necessary skills to conduct interviews.130
PEACE has not escaped criticism. Clarke and colleagues found,
for example, that officers were less skilled at exploring suspect’s ac-
122Andy Griffiths & Becky Milne, Will it All End in Tiers? Police Interviews with
Suspects in Britain, in INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING 167–89 (Thomas Williamson. ed.,
2006).
123Stephen Moston, Geoffrey M. Stephenson, & Thomas M. Williamson, The
Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During Police Questioning,
32 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 23 (1992).
124
“The Cardiff Three” were wrongly convicted for the murder of Lynette White
in South Wales in 1988. Significant concerns were raised about the conduct of the
investigation. See Richard Horwell, Mouncher Investigation Report, GOV.UK (Jul.
18, 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo
ads/attachment_data/file/629725/mouncher_report_web_accessible_july_2017.pdf.
125David Dixon, Questioning Suspects: A Comparative Perspective, 26 J.
CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUST. 426 (2010).
126See, e.g., College of Policing, Investigation: Investigative Interviewing (Mar.
18, 2019), https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigativ
e-interviewing/.
127Fiona Brookman & Amanda Wakefield, Criminal Investigation, in THE SAGE
DICTIONARY OF POLICING 65 (Amanda Wakefield & Jenny Fleming. eds., 2009); Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, Investigative interviewing, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 466 (T.
Newburn et al. eds., 2007).
128Gisli H. Gudjonsson & John Pearse, Suspect Interviews and False Confes-
sions, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 33 (2011).
129COOK & TATTERSALL, supra note 101, at 310.
130Griffiths & Milne, supra note 122, at 168.
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counts than they were at covering legal and procedural matters.131
Conversely, Leahy-Harland and Bull explain that studies of police
interviewing post-PACE and post-PEACE have found “little evidence
of such manipulative and coercive ‘Reid-like’ tactics.”132 In addition,
the benefits of adopting the PEACE model of interviewing in other
countries, such as Canada, have been discussed.133
Although both Miranda and PACE were borne out of a desire to
address police interrogation practices, clear differences are
emerging. In particular, PACE is seemingly more comprehensive,
with its Codes of Practice documenting suspects’ rights, and police
powers, in detail. Indeed, one of the rights that suspects in custody
have is to view the Codes of Practice.134 This kind of transparency,
combined with the introduction of the PEACE model of interviewing,
tends to suggest a professionalization of suspect interviewing in the
UK.
F. Overview
The foregone review illustrates that the police interrogation of
suspects has been surrounded by much disquiet in both the USA
and the UK for several decades. Both jurisdictions responded to the
problems associated with police interrogations with the introduction
of key changes in legal procedure—Miranda v. Arizona in 1966 and
PACE in 1984, respectively—in an effort to improve suspects’ rights
during interviews.
The limited evidence from the UK suggests that PACE and other
related measures have been largely accepted and adopted by police.
In contrast, since its inception, Miranda has been shrouded in
controversy and as Smalarz and colleagues put it, “well-intentioned
as it was, Miranda has not served the protective functions that the
U.S. Supreme Court intended.”135 One of the reasons for this, ac-
cording to Jacobi, is that the Court did not “anticipate the effect of its
solution [Miranda] upon other parties to the interaction: the police”
131Colin Clarke, Becky Milne, & Ray Bull, Interviewing Suspects of Crime: The
Impact of PEACE Training, Supervision and the Presence of a Legal Advisor, 8 J.
INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 149 (2011).
132Samantha Leahy-Harland & Ray Bull, Police Strategies and Suspect
Responses in Real-Life Serious Crime Interview, 32 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 138,
142 (2017).
133Brent Snook, Joseph Eastwood, Michael Stinson, John Tedeschini, John C.
House, Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada, 52 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY
& CRIM. JUST. 215 (2010).
134Home Office, supra note 107, at 12–19.
135Smalarz, et al., supra note 29, at 455.
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who have developed numerous techniques to dissuade suspects
from invoking their Miranda rights.136 As Leo explains:
The entire process of interrogation is structured to advance the penal
interests of the state and secure a conviction. Yet, unlike courtroom
lawyers, police interrogators do not represent themselves as the
suspect’s adversary. Instead, in what must be one of the deepest
ironies of American criminal justice, they portray themselves as the
suspect’s advocate[.]137
In this paper we present data gathered from homicide units in the
USA and the UK in order to explore how and why homicide detec-
tives in these countries have responded differently to similarly
intentioned legal reforms instituted to enhance suspects’ rights dur-
ing police interrogations. Before considering the findings, we
describe the methodology used in this study.
III. METHODS
This paper is based on qualitative data gathered at intervals over
a period of eight years in eleven different police areas, seven in the
UK and four in the USA.138 This involved a total of 129 interviews
with homicide investigators (58 in the USA and 71 in the UK), as
well as more than 700 hours of ethnographic shadowing and
observation.139 The latter included shadowing four specific homicide
investigations in Britain for a period of 120 hours and five homicide
investigations in the USA for a total of 190 hours. Extensive field
notes were produced from these observations, including records of
numerous informal conversations with detectives and senior officers.
In addition, we viewed over twelve hours of video-recorded
interrogations/interviews from the USA and UK. The detectives
interviewed had a broad range of experience within homicide units,
from those who had only recently joined a homicide team and had
investigated a handful of murders, to those with more than twenty
years of service and many hundreds of investigations completed.
Five of the investigators in the USA were “managers” (holding the
rank of Lieutenant, Captain, or Major) who oversaw the work of
detectives. Sixteen of those in the UK were retired senior detectives
who had held both investigative and management roles. Eleven of
136Jacobi, supra note 29, at 13.
137Leo, supra note 5, at 11.
138The majority of the data drawn upon for this paper were collected by the first
author as part of an ethnographic research project exploring homicide investigation
in the UK and the USA (i.e. 101 of the interviews and all of the fieldwork in the UK).
The paper also draws upon interviews conducted by the second author as part of
her PhD research that examined the changing nature of homicide investigation in
England and Wales. As part of this research, fourteen former detectives and thirteen
currently-serving detectives were interviewed.
139Interviews were conducted with detectives in all four agencies in the USA,
but in two of them, no sustained observations or shadowing were undertaken.
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the investigators interviewed were women (eight in the UK and three
in the USA). Data from the UK were collected between January
2008 and July 2016. Data from the USA were collected between
April 2012 and August 2013 with two follow-up interviews conducted
with a long-serving homicide detective in 2018.
The selection of police organizations and interviewees was based
on convenience, rather than random sampling. Nevertheless, the
agencies studied in both countries varied sufficiently to allow for a
modest level of generalization. In the UK, fieldwork was conducted
in police force areas in England and Wales with different population
compositions and a range of homicide rates and detection rates. In
the USA, it was carried out in four police agencies on the east coast
which all had homicide rates above the national average, and which
had all at times experienced problems particularly with gang-related
murders and challenges in securing witness co-operation during
investigations. Interviews were conducted with detectives in all four
agencies, but in two of them no sustained observations or shadow-
ing were undertaken.
Interviews were conducted in private (usually in empty rooms in
the criminal investigation or homicide departments). One hundred
and fourteen the 128 interviews were digitally recorded; for the
remainder, detailed hand-written notes were typed up as soon as
possible afterwards. Interviews lasted an average of seventy
minutes, were transcribed verbatim, and were analyzed thematically
and comparatively using the qualitative software package NVivo,
Version Eleven. Nodes and sub-nodes were created incrementally
as each transcript was read and re-read in depth. For example,
detectives’ broad responses to questions about interviews or inter-
rogations became a first level node, within which several sub-nodes
were created, each covering their comments about particular issues
such as the legal framework for interviewing (e.g. Miranda and
PACE), the role/value of confessional evidence, false confessions,
detective interviewing skills and so forth. In addition, four homicide
investigations were shadowed for a total period of 120 hours in the
UK and five homicide investigations were shadowed for a total of
190 hours in the USA. Extensive field notes were produced from
these observations, including records of numerous informal
conversations with detectives and senior officers.
All identifying information related to the officers who took part in
the research and the research sites have been excluded in order to
protect the anonymity of the research participants.
IV. FINDINGS
We begin this section by illustrating some of the different ways
that homicide detectives in the UK and USA have “received” and
responded to legal reforms governing the interrogation of homicide
suspects. We then consider various tactics used by detectives in
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homicide units in the USA to persuade suspects to waive their
Miranda rights before moving on to consider the implications of
these findings for justice.
A. The Introduction of PACE and Miranda: Necessary
Safeguard or Unnecessary Obstacle?
The introduction of PACE followed a series of miscarriages of
justice that came to light in the 1970s and 1980s and a subsequent
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure that identified numerous
concerns in respect of questioning techniques, malpractice and the
overall behavior of the police.140 There was, in short, a growing
sense at this time that the police needed to be controlled. Despite
some initial skepticism, British detectives appear to have accepted
that the introduction of PACE was a necessary step towards govern-
ing the police and protecting suspects, as the following quotations
illustrate:
Policing couldn’t face a next generation of being criticized in terms of
how investigations were run. They have got to be transparent and they
have got to be auditable and they have got to be thorough. (Homicide
Detective, UK)
I think it was a change for the good, I really do. It brought safeguards
for both sides. (Homicide Detective, UK)
Detectives in the UK described PACE as leading to the increased
accountability of detectives and felt that this was necessary, given
the history of problematic confessional evidence pre-PACE:
There are allegations in the past of people being threatened and beaten
up and you know tortured technically to make confessions, I mean that
wouldn’t happen in today’s practices because of the way PACE has
come in and the control over interviews and again the accountability
there, so I see that as a good thing, I see PACE as a good thing.
(Homicide Detective, UK)
PACE was also regarded by many detectives as having profes-
sionalized homicide investigations:
I think, any investigation became more professional when the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act was introduced. I think there’s no doubt it’s
made everybody more professional in the way they investigated any
offence. (Homicide Detective, UK)
PACE appears to have become firmly embedded in police culture
and the idea of subverting the spirit and intent of the legislation is
generally not accepted by detectives or other criminal justice system
actors. In 2011, an SIO investigating the disappearance of a young
woman questioned the suspect in violation of PACE (the suspect
wasn’t cautioned or given the opportunity to have a solicitor
140Poyser & Milne, supra note 2, at 63–65.
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present).141 Despite the fact that the suspect took the detective to the
woman’s body during the “interview,” as well as to the location of a
second victim, the evidence pertaining to the suspect’s confession
was deemed inadmissible.142 Detectives interviewed during our
research generally supported the legal outcome in this case, as one
detective explained:
You can’t go back. The law has been put into tablets of stone for a
reason and you can’t get a time machine and go back. So, I’m sorry,
you can’t support what he did. (Homicide Detective, UK)
In short, homicide detectives in the UK stated that they accepted
the introduction of PACE and viewed it as having had a positive
influence on investigations and investigators. By contrast, homicide
detectives in the United States interviewed as part of our research
seem to have reacted rather differently to the introduction of Miranda.
Of note, we did not observe the widespread acceptance of
procedural reform among the United States detectives that we
observed among detectives in the UK. Rather than being viewed as
a means by which both detectives and suspects could be safe-
guarded, Miranda was described as a constraint. As one U.S.
homicide detective put it, “The odds are really stacked against us.”
In particular, Miranda was viewed as a barrier to an important part
of the detective’s role—speaking to people freely:
I have the right to talk to anybody I want to. I could stop you on a
street corner and talk to you, not necessarily stop you for that means
. . . I could see you walking down the street and say, “Can I talk to
you for a minute?” “Hey, where were you last night?” “Last night, did
you happen to be over there at the store down the street?” “Were you
there?” “I know a murder took place down there and stuff,” and I’m sit-
ting there asking you questions about a murder. I have to Mirandize
you before that? No way. We do it all the time. Sometimes these people
don’t have fixed addresses, we’re going to see them walking down the
street, there he is now. Hey, excuse me, you got a second? Yeah,
what do you want, yeah well hang on before I talk to you let me tell
you have the right to remain silent, anything that you . . . come on
. . . no I want to get . . . I want to start talking to you right now.
(Homicide Detective, USA)
Detectives in the USA placed considerable importance on their
ability to speak to suspects and most detectives explained that their
ultimate goal during an interrogation was to obtain the suspect’s
confession. Those interviewed for this research suggested that Mi-
randa has made this more challenging:
141INDEP. POLICE COMPLAINTS COMM’N, INVESTIGATION ARISING FROM OPERATION MAYAN INTO
THE CONDUCT OF DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT STEPHEN FULCHER: INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION




142IPPC, supra note 141, at 14.
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It’s tough, but ultimately you always want a confession. But at the
same time, the way the laws are with the Miranda rights, most people
aren’t going to give you a statement anyway. Or when you do get
heated with them—let’s say you do come in and start talking to me,
once I start getting you possibly on the verge of where you know I’ve
got you caught in a bunch of lies and you’re like, you know what, I
want a lawyer. Let’s end it right here. I’m not going to say anything
else. So then you can’t go any further. You can’t get a statement. You
can’t get a confession because they want to ask for an attorney. So it
kind of limits you. (Homicide Detective, USA)
When asked what they would change about homicide investiga-
tions, some detectives cited the Miranda ruling, due to the “barriers”
imposed:
The Miranda laws, that every suspect or a person—anybody that we
deem as associated with a case has to give us some kind of a state-
ment, some form of a statement . . . in reference to a homicide case,
that anybody involved, that the police want to interview, has to give us
some kind of a statement, verbal statement, written statement,
something. They can’t just say, “I want a lawyer and I don’t want to talk
to you.” (Homicide Detective, USA)143
Another important distinction that emerged during our research,
was the status that U.S. and British detectives afforded to confes-
sional evidence, to which we now turn.
B. The Status of the Confession
Detectives in the United States whom we interviewed and
observed placed great importance upon inducing suspects to talk.
This was, in part at least, because confessional evidence was
viewed as particularly compelling and impactful when compared to
other kinds of evidence that detectives might secure:
Confessional evidence still outshines any other evidence. A confession
is more important than almost a fingerprint or DNA. (Homicide Detec-
tive, USA)
I mean it’s their account, it’s their admission . . . What more do you
want than someone to say and tell you they did it. (Homicide Detec-
tive, USA)
The homicide detectives that we spoke to in the UK explained that
obtaining a confession had historically been the goal of an interview:
143Notably, this response reveals how ill-informed detectives can be about the
law of interrogations. As a leading criminal procedure text in the United States
explained:
No particular words are required to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. A
suspect, therefore, does not need to use formal language like “I invoke my right to remain
silent.” Colloquialisms such as “I don’t not want to talk to you” would be sufficient. For
example, in Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87 (4th Cir. 2011), the court found that a suspect’s
statement that he “decided not to say any more” was sufficient to invoke his Fifth Amend-
ment rights.
JOHN FERDICO, HENRY F. FRADELLA, AND CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 538 (12th ed. 2015).
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In the old days you’d always go for a confession if you could. (Homicide
Detective, UK)
In contrast to the United States, however, it became apparent that
this is no longer the case:
I would say that the interview of a suspect has moved away from the
goal of securing a confession, which is what it always was when they
oppressed and they poorly treated in order to gain a confession that
was the goal of an interview years ago. (Homicide Detective, UK)
The introduction of PACE and, in particular, the advice often given
by solicitors to suspects to “give no-comment” interviews, had led
detectives in the UK to no longer expect a suspect to confess to a
homicide:
[T]here is no expectation to get a confession and there’s absolutely no
reliance on a confession. Even if you get a confession we would as-
sume it would be challenged and that we would have to have extra
evidence. Most cops would not now think that a confession alone was
going to be enough to win them the case. So it would be seen more as
a bonus than the definitive evidence that’s going to win them the case
in the UK. (Homicide Detective, UK)
Other British detectives explained that the aim of the interview in
the UK had shifted considerably since the introduction of PACE and
PEACE from expecting a confession towards exploring and “shutting
down” possible defenses that might later be offered at court by the
suspect:
I think the more modern way of thinking is that we have to shut down
any area of defense. (Homicide Detective, UK)
Finally, some detectives indicated that there exists a sense of
“unease” with relying exclusively upon confessional evidence, given
the increasing availability of other forms of evidence:
I’m uneasy about relying solely on a confession to convict somebody
because bizarrely people do confess to things that they haven’t done.
So it’s actually forced the police in the UK to invest more heavily in sci-
ence and technology, which arguably provides a safer conviction. So
I’m not unhappy about the fact overall that the “no comment” interview
phenomenon began in 1986.” (Homicide Detective, UK)
A lot of convictions in the past were based on confessions or false
confessions or oppression whereas very often now the evidence now
is far safer in terms of the technology that proves it. (Homicide Detec-
tive, UK)
If we look at the U.S. detection rates for murder which, it varies but
where I’ve worked in New York they’re up there with 70 or 80% so
they’re pretty respectable; they feel they are . . . but they’re very
heavily based on confession evidence. Rarely do they have lawyers
involved, and one has to say, well are they safe convictions? And they
obviously would say they are. Nobody wants to convict the wrong
people, but we probably in the UK are now basing our convictions far
more on scientific evidence which is probably more rigorous than a
confession. (Homicide Detective, UK)
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In contrast, the elevated status of confessional evidence amongst
U.S homicide detectives appeared to be intricately entwined with
their distinct status as homicide detectives. Inducing suspects to talk
and, ultimately obtaining a full confession, was considered to be an
intrinsic part of the detectives’ role and indeed, in the USA homicide
units studied, it was viewed as an important skill to be able to
persuade suspects (and witnesses) to talk. And detectives generally
prided themselves on having the skills to do so:
Most investigators like interrogating and interviewing people. I like
catching people in lies and calling them out on it and trying to get them
to admit to something that they did. It’s tough but ultimately you always
want a confession. (Homicide Detective, USA)
I think anybody that wants to be a good investigator, that’s what they
live for to get that confession, and there’s nothing better than that. I’ve
just gotten my first full confession two weeks ago, as far as a murder
case and that felt good; you wanted to scream inside when he was
telling you his story. (Homicide Detective, USA)
The less prominent role afforded to the confession in homicide
investigations in the UK may also be explained by the fragmentation
of roles within homicide investigations. Unlike in the U.S homicide
units studied, where the lead homicide investigator (amongst the
small team of around six detectives) often undertook suspect inter-
rogations, in the UK, suspect interviews are undertaken by specialist
interviewers, as opposed to detectives who are directly involved in
the case:
I think we’re probably now far more professional in the way that our
interviewers are trained; we have different categories of interviewing
as somebody progresses in their experience and skill in interviewing.
The tier two, tier three, tier five interview advisor levels. So it’s prob-
ably a much more professionalized and scientific approach to the way
in which we interview now as to years ago when you just said a
hundred times to somebody “you did it didn’t you? You did it didn’t
you?” until they said they did it. (Homicide Detective, UK)
A clear distinction between the homicide detectives in the USA
and UK emerged throughout the analysis of our data. Detectives in
the USA prided themselves on being excellent interrogators with the
ability to outwit their suspects. Conversely, in the UK, detectives
rarely spoke of such skills, instead priding themselves on their
professionalism and the adoption of new legislation and new models
of interviewing:
I think the professionalization of it is a good thing overall and I think
that the benefits of having a model far outweigh the place we were in
before where what made a good interviewer had a bit of mystique
around it, so I think that’s a good thing. (Homicide Detective, UK)
In summary, our data suggests that homicide detectives in the
USA and UK have responded differently to the introduction of similar
legal reforms governing suspect interrogations. Whilst there has
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been a general acceptance of PACE amongst detectives in the UK
and an acknowledgement that it has helped to professionalize detec-
tive practice, U.S. detectives included in the research have seem-
ingly not accepted Miranda in the same ways, viewing it as an
obstacle to effective working practices. As a result of this mind-set,
the U.S. detectives that we spoke to had found numerous ways to
circumvent Miranda, to which we now turn.
C. Outsmarting the Suspect
In the UK, a suspect must be cautioned before being asked any
questions about a suspected criminal offence.144 The interview must
also take place at a police station unless there are exceptional
circumstances, for example, if a subsequent delay could lead to
someone coming to physical harm. In addition, if a suspect chooses
to have a solicitor present, their solicitor must be given sufficient
information to allow them to understand the nature of the suspected
offence.145 In the USA the Miranda warnings relate specifically and
only to custodial interrogation. However, detectives in the United
States can and do conduct non-custodial interrogations with
suspects that do not require the warnings to be given, as illustrated
in the field note extract below:
Often what you have is just short of enough to charge and so you
gamble to get a confession. There is also the option of non-custodial
interviews; make them think that they are free to leave and that you
are their friend. (Field notes, USA)
One detective gave an example of a case during which he had
conducted a non-custodial interview:
I’d interviewed him at the hospital to keep it non-custodial . . . I can
ask him any and everything because it’s non-custodial at the hospital.
(Homicide Detective, USA)146
Similarly, detectives would avoid arresting suspects so that they
144In England and Wales, the caution reads as follows: “You do not have to say
anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned
something which you later rely on in Court. Anything you do say may be given in
evidence.” See Home Office, supra note 107, at 34.
145Home Office, supra note 107, at 36.
146Again, this quote illustrates the potential confusion of U.S. detectives about
the muddled state of the law of interrogations. The location of an interview is an
important, but not determinative factor in determining whether an interrogation is
custodial. “As a rule, interrogation in public places such as stores, restaurants, bars,
streets, and sidewalks is usually considered noncustodial because people are in
such locations by personal choice, are not isolated from the outside world, and
rarely present a police-dominated atmosphere.” FERDICO ET AL., supra note 143, at
527. But other indicia of custody that suggest a suspect is not free to leave—
whether the suspect or the police initiated contact; the degree of restraint or force
used to detain the suspect during questioning; the number of officers questioning
the suspect; the duration and character of the interrogation, including the degree of
psychological coercion employed; the language used; and the extent to which the
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did not have to read them their rights. In this case the suspect spoke
to the detective for fourteen hours without being arrested and
informed of his Miranda rights. The suspect was not arrested for
another six months:
Yeah I’ll explain to you what the law says, even though some of these
liberal lawyers . . . if I’m not going to arrest you, I don’t have to issue
Miranda warnings. So you have to have custody and interrogation. So
we’re interrogating you, but like this guy, we didn’t have custody of
him, “Hey do you mind coming down the police station with me?” “Yeah
I’ll come down and talk to you.” Okay let’s go. Put him in the car and
get him down there. He stayed there, he wanted to go outside and
smoke a cigarette, he went outside and smoked a cigarette, I said
come back on in, he comes back on in. If you’re in custody you don’t
get to just go outside and smoke cigarettes. So he’s not in custody,
even though I think you did it, that doesn’t mean I’m going to arrest
you, I may think absolutely you did this, but that doesn’t mean I can ar-
rest you, that doesn’t mean I can take you into custody. (Homicide
Detective, USA)
Another example of how homicide detectives attempted to
outsmart suspects was observed in one police department, where
the “Homicide Unit” signage had been purposely removed from the
entrance to the squad offices so that when suspects were “brought
in” they would not know that they were a suspect in a murder
investigation, as the Lieutenant in that Unit explained:
Well that’s why we took the [homicide] placard off the wall, so that
when they are brought in, we can bring him on a ruse that, you know,
it was a robbery, if we knew that he was out committing robberies. He
had an open warrant for something else. You know we went and picked
him up based upon that, instead of you know tugging on a warrant for
murder. [It’s] a huge advantage because it’s the element of surprise.
(Homicide Detective, USA)
The element of surprise was viewed as important in this context
because the very sight of the word “homicide” could discourage
suspects to talk:
All the other offices have signs: sexual assault unit, domestic violence
unit, you know, robbery unit yes, homicide you definitely—no, that’s
not going to work. We learned that quick! When they see that sign
they’re like “I’m coming in for homicide?!” and you say hold up a second
that sign cannot be there. (Homicide Detective Sergeant, USA)
The Sergeant explained that members of the warrant squad, who
suspect is confronted with evidence of guilt—may nonetheless turn questioning in a
nonpublic or quasi-public location, such as a hospital, into a custodial interrogation.
FERDICO ET AL., supra note 143, at 527 (comparing State v. Lescard, 128 N.H. 495,
517 A.2d 1158 (1986) (finding of custody when suspect brought in handcuffed to the
hospital by police) with State v. Pontbriand, 178 Vt. 120, 2005 VT 20, 878 A.2d 227,
25 A.L.R.6th 763 (2005) (finding no custody for “routine questioning” of a suspect
who was not confined by police, but rather was unable to leave due to a medical
condition)).
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are sent to arrest homicide suspects, are specifically instructed not
to divulge to suspects the reason for their arrest:
When they go out and pick someone up and they’re asking, “why am I
arrested,” they’ll tell them “the investigator will tell you that when we
get you down to the office.” (Homicide Detective Sergeant, USA)
Detectives would often continue to keep suspects “in the dark”
even when they arrived at the police station. For example, in one of
the recorded interrogations that we observed, the suspect repeat-
edly asked why he had been brought in for questioning. He stated
that he had asked the officers who brought him but was not told.
The homicide detectives maintained that they were unable to tell
him until he waived his Miranda rights. They said only that they were
working on an “incident” during which the suspect’s “name came up”
and they had enough information to “get an arrest warrant.” It is only
when the suspect had waived his Miranda rights that he was told
that he had been named as the suspect in a shooting. Moreover, it
was only at the end of the interrogation, when the suspect had
provided a full confession, that he was told that the charge was first
degree murder.
D. “The Truth Will Set You Free”
Convincing suspects that it is in their best interest to speak to the
detectives is a long-established interrogation tactic. As one detective
told a homicide suspect during an interrogation: “the truth will set
you free” (Extract from Interrogation of Homicide Suspect, USA). Of
course, quite the reverse is true if the interviewee is indeed the killer.
Nevertheless, detectives suggest to suspects that they will “feel” bet-
ter if they tell their story and that it will be in some sense, cathartic.
This was apparent during one interrogation we observed. The
suspect claimed to be unaware of why he had been brought in for
questioning or anything about the “incident” of interest to the
detectives. The two detectives told the suspect that they could not
give him any information about why he was there until he agreed to
talk to them and waive his rights. They stressed how much they
wanted to hear what he had to say and that they were keen to give
him this opportunity, with one detective saying: “We would love to
hear from you, you understand?” (Extract from Interrogation of
Homicide Suspect, USA).
Detectives acknowledged that suspects sometimes liked to talk
and detectives and played on this when adopting tactics of
“encouragement,” as illustrated in the following quotations:
I think a lot of them believe that they can really talk their way out of it.
Or give a justifiable enough reason to explain their actions. (Homicide
Detective, USA)
I can theorize it, and it’s beyond my, not comprehension, but I would
never do so, is most people are talkers; and they want to profess their
innocence, even though they are guilty. And some people honestly
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think that, even though they are in handcuffs—they might be
handcuffed to a table that very moment they are speaking to you—that
they want to talk their way out of it, and that you will be going home,
and that you are going to release them and let them go home . . .
also like a lot of these guys are talkers, and gamesmen on the road;
whether they are gamesmen with their buddies, because that’s all a lot
of crime is, and how that begins is of one-upmanship, or you did this,
when I have to something next better. (Homicide Detective, USA)
E. Knowing your Opponent
U.S. detectives indicated to us that where possible they would
research the suspect prior to interrogation in order to “size up” their
“opponent.” This might involve examining a suspect’s criminal his-
tory and prior experience of custody or speaking to other detectives
who had interviewed the suspect in the past in order to gauge the
likelihood that the suspect would waive his rights. During one inter-
rogation recording that we observed, the homicide suspect was left
alone in the interrogation room for just over one hour before the
detectives entered, during which time they were conducting
“research” on him.
Learning about a suspect was also viewed as a way to help detec-
tives to build rapport with their “opponent.” Some detectives spent
time during early opening parts of the interrogation gathering
information that could be used later in the interrogation to urge the
suspect to confess:
Anything, an ice breaker. You want to figure out . . . he arrested in
this area, the Washington Redskins, the football team. So you know,
are you a Skins fan, are you a Dallas Cowboy fan? Because that’s the
rival team for the Washington Redskins because there’s a lot of
Redskin and Cowboy fans, they hate each other. The teams are rivals.
You want to figure out what fan they are if it’s a male or what football
team he’s a fan of or what his interests are, sit down . . . he got kids,
how old are they, baby mama we’d call them. He got kids by this girl
outside, or is he married, how many kids has he got. You can tell if
those kids mean anything to him and stuff like that because you know,
you want to kind of remind him later. Now you don’t want another man
raising your child. You don’t want another man calling . . . your child
calling another man daddy. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Another detective explained that the techniques he used to
persuade suspects to waive their rights were varied, but involved
background research and praying with them:
All different, different ones. First I’ll sit in here and talk to them, to kind
of get their background, where they come from, where their parents
are, you know just family. And depending on if I take, I’ve taken differ-
ent routes, as their friends, as spiritual—I pray with people, I’ve held
their hand right here, said prayers you know. It just depends on how I
feel they are, yes. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Building rapport often involved portraying a neutral or understand-
ing stance:
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This person needs to know that you’re human and needs to know that
you think that they’re human and that you’re not looking down your
nose. And a lot of times in my interviews I’ll say something like, I’m not
here to judge you, I’m just here to find out what happened and there’s
more than one side to any story and this is your opportunity to tell your
side of the story. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Other detectives spoke of how they would befriend suspects:
I may want to wring his neck, I may want to kill this guy who just raped
this sixty-five-year-old woman, but you can’t have that on your face.
You have to go in there, shake his hand, be his buddy, you know, hey
man, it’s not your fault that she’s walking around in sexy lingerie, that’s
her fault. You know, put it on her, anything to get this guy to say he did
it, you know what I mean? So when you teach these guys how to just
take your anger out when you leave the interview because you can’t
bring that in. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Well, my partner is pretty clever and we do good cop/bad cop as much,
we do more like we’re both good cops. We’re sympathetic towards
you, towards the position your cousin or whoever puts you in and
we’ve got to right this wrong. We plead to their moral sides and, look, I
knew you didn’t want this to happen, but it did and . . . we’re going to
get there whether you help us or not. But it’s time for you to do
something right . . . And that morally changes things, but there are
some that are tougher than others. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Other detectives spoke specifically about the juxtaposition
between the old, coercive “third degree” methods of interrogation
and new befriending techniques:
Most of our techniques now in American law enforcement are nothing
to do with physical coercion, threats, anything like that; it’s more about
kind, treating them like human beings. Yeah, it’s more about being
kind to the people and treating them like they’re decent folks, even
though they’ve been treated like they are pieces of crap their whole
life, even though they’re feared on the street, treating them like they’re
your brother, you know? (Homicide Detective, USA)
Although the current approach to interrogations is an undeniable
improvement on the overly forceful “third degree” methods that were
once so popular, the evidence presented so far suggests that these
“new” approaches do not necessarily result in suspects being af-
forded the rights that Miranda purported to provide.
F. Trivializing
A common tactic used by detectives in our research involved
trivializing the Miranda warnings, exemplified in the following quota-
tions from U.S. homicide detectives:
We are so used to advising suspects of their rights and its easy
because you . . . for instance I don’t go in the room and say “you’ve
murdered this person,” because that’s at this level (raised hand high)
so you want to bring it down some—“you hurt that person, you shot
that person.” That doesn’t seem as intimidating. It’s the same ap-
proach when you’re advising someone of their rights. So I’d say, “you
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watch TV right?” (Yeah everybody watch TV). You’ve seen when the
police approach somebody and what do they normally do before they
question somebody? (They read them their rights). Yes, do you know
your rights? They usually give you three of them. They always give
you I’ve got the right to remain silent, anything I say or do can be used
against me in court, I’ve got the right to a lawyer, they know all that, off
the bat, from watching TV cos it’s on there all the time so we use that
to get them talking, to break the ice. Then you keep on going until the
Miranda rights and then you’re like, so you understand all your rights?
Then you do the formal waiver” (Homicide Detective, USA).
“If you know this is your guy, or even believe it, you’ve got to get that
waiver down pretty quick. And my philosophy is the sooner you
introduce it the better off you are. You do it on the basis for it’s very
mundane but look, I want to talk to you about this situation, I’m not
saying that you had anything to do with it but there’s a possibility you
have some information that it might help further this situation but before
I could talk to you about that I need . . . you’ve seen this before on
TV where they have to advise you of your rights. You go through the
rights and we try to maintain it as basically, just a formality, and make
sure that they know and you emphasize this, and this is what I
emphasize is that look, you control this conversation, you can start
talking to me anytime that you want to, that you feel that this isn’t go-
ing in a direction that like, you control everything, you’re in charge.
Just to get past that waiver. And a lot of times they’ll sign off on it
because they want to know what you know. They’re expecting me to
tell them everything about this case to see how vulnerable they are. So
let’s get the waiver through first, try to do it as nonchalant, as a minor,
let’s just make it a little down the road—not a speedboat, but just kind
of do it quickly, put it out of sight, out of mind, and then just try to . . .
you don’t go right in to your case, that’s where now you start the
interview process about, tell me about yourself, let’s just talk. You want
that waiver to be the farthest thing from their mind. You want them to
forget about the fact that at any given time they can say I want my
lawyer and this has got to stop, you want to put that out of their mind.
Now basically you want to start them on a path of I need to explain to
you why I didn’t do this. And then keep the dialogue going, taking note
of every little detail. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Our observations of interrogations confirmed what the detectives
reported, such as the routine use of processes of normalization and
trivialization in order to encourage suspects to waive their Miranda
rights. Time after time, suspects were told that detectives were un-
able to speak to them until after they “got past” the bureaucracy of
the waiver form.
G. Trickery and Deceit
Although Miranda states that suspects have the right to remain
silent and the right to an attorney during an interrogation, the U.S.
homicide detectives we observed were rarely interested in ensuring
that suspects were afforded this legal right. Whilst they did not usu-
ally breach the Miranda requirements in a clear-cut manner—as this
would risk the case being lost later in the judicial process—they had
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found various ingenious ways, both before and during interviews, to
ensure that homicide suspects did not invoke their rights
Deflecting suspects from asking to have an attorney present dur-
ing interview was a common tactic. This included refusing to permit
attorneys (who had been sent by suspects’ family members or
friends) access to suspects unless the suspect had specifically asked
to see an attorney and ignoring any subtle or less than overt requests
from suspects to speak to an attorney. The latter was explained as a
matter of semantics, by one young homicide detective:
It’s a matter of semantics. I may need a lawyer or I think I may need a
lawyer is not an invocation. I want a lawyer is. Even attorneys are
confused about some statements and what they constitute. (Field
notes, USA)
Another detectives explained to us the fine lines that detectives
navigated during suspect interrogations:
“When you advise somebody of their rights, it never goes like smooth,
there’s always one thing here and there. There’s three things that the
person . . . first of all they have to understand their rights fully.
Secondly you cannot threaten them in any way. And thirdly you cannot
offer them anything for them to tell you. So sometimes you play with
the words. I might say a word and I meant something but the attorney
who is now listening to the interview—because every time we interview
a suspect there has to be a recording—they can twist the words around
and say, “Wow that sounds like a promise.” So we fight that in court,
like, “Oh, no, it’s not a promise, this is what he told him and he was
very specific.” So you deal with things like that. Some members in the
community they’re very ignorant about their rights and they ask you
questions. They might say something like, “Do you think I need an at-
torney?” And just because they say the word attorney doesn’t mean
that you have to stop talking to them. I usually ask them again, “It’s
your decision. Tell me, you want an attorney with you here present
before I continue?” And if they say, “No,” I just keep going with my
interview. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Other more seasoned detectives suggested that they instinctively
knew when suspects might be about to invoke their rights and had
become adept at changing the subject:
I can usually see what’s coming . . . not see it, but I know what they’re
going to say just from doing it for so long and I’ll change the subject
quick to go to something else so that I don’t have to deal with that.
That’s my method of trying to . . . not deal with it.” (Homicide Detec-
tive, USA)
According to this interviewee, only around 20% of suspects ask to
speak to an attorney; the remaining 80% waive their Miranda rights,
illustrating that detectives’ tactics are often successful:
Yeah, they waive . . . I’m not saying they confess but they agree to
speak with you, they don’t say, “I want an attorney,” and cut off
immediately. Now, within that 80% there are people that will talk for an
hour and then at some point it’s like they think they can’t outsmart you
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or outtalk you, so then it’s like, “Well, I’m not getting anywhere, I want
an attorney.” Or if they start to feel pressure with their . . . They might
say something they think’s going to hurt them, they’ll ask for an
attorney. But I would say it’s probably even less than 20% actually
walk in the room and say, “I want to talk to an attorney.” It doesn’t hap-
pen that often. (Homicide Detective, USA)
The account that we have presented thus far illustrates the many
and varied ways in which U.S. homicide detectives circumvent
Miranda to their advantage. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
detectives, though often successful in these endeavors, sometimes
made costly mistakes that adversely affected the prosecution of their
case. To illustrate, one detective explained:
I had a case where a guy, he comes in and we had an arrest warrant
for him for murder but he also had an open warrant for something else,
like possession of an open alcohol container, something small. So he
comes into the interrogation room, this guy speaks only Spanish so a
Spanish investigator had to interview him. So when he comes in, he
reads him his advice of rights. The guy is like, I want an attorney for
when I go to court, or he said—at some point he said, I want an
attorney. So the investigator gets up to walk out and he’s like, “well
you’re charged with murder. I just want to let you know you’re charged
with murder.” He’s like, “well I want to talk to you.” He’s like, “well you
asked for an attorney.” He said, “no I mean, I want an attorney for
court.” So he talked to me, confessed to the murder, but they wouldn’t
bring it in. They said, he asked for an attorney. Yes . . . even though
he actually—he’d meant—he just wanted an attorney for court. He
wanted to talk right then . . . So it’s very strict. A lot of the time you’re
going to lose confessions if they even mention the word lawyer a lot of
times . . . to me it’s kind of like it’s not right because here you are,
you’re trying to find out the truth of what happened, you have a murder,
so basically you have evidence—somebody confesses to a murder
and it’s true, it’s a legitimate confession but a jury can’t see that or it
can’t come into court. It makes no sense to me whatsoever. (Homicide
Detective, USA)
Given the high price that detectives can pay if their use of the
Miranda warnings is brought into question, it is perhaps surprising
that detectives sail so close to the wind in whether and how they
deliver the warnings. More surprisingly, our data indicate that
homicide detectives in the USA often go further than playing with
words and engage in deception, as illustrated in the following extract:
Yes you can lie to suspects. How it helps? Well you must use it care-
fully and not bluff unless it is credible. So you might say that the co-
defendant said X, Y or Z in multiple suspect cases. There is case law
all the way up to the Supreme Court that indicates that deception is
allowed. The only thing we have to do is Miranda. (Homicide Detec-
tive, USA)
Moreover, detectives often spoke about the use of “calculated lies”
as being an integral skill of the “good” or “successful” homicide
detective:
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Any detective that’s any good has lied to a suspect plenty of times. But
you have to be careful. You have got to be very well calculated and
stuff so, but it’s a good tool. (Homicide Detective, USA)
Detectives told a range of lies to suspects including suggesting
that co-defendants had already implicated them in the murder or
that there was physical evidence to link them to the murder:
You don’t want us to go away today thinking that you are a cold
blooded murderer. Now we know you were there so let’s not even get
into that. We have your DNA at the scene (this was not true). So, we
know you were there, that’s a given, but what you can do is tell us why
you were there. (Field notes, USA)
The fact that U.S. detectives are permitted to deceive suspects in
their pursuit of a confession is the most glaring difference that we
observed between interrogations in the UK and the USA.147
H. Summary
Our data have illuminated some key and stark differences in how
homicide detectives in the USA and UK have responded to legal
reforms that were designed to regulate the questioning of suspects.
Homicide detectives in the UK viewed the introduction of PACE as a
necessary step forward. In its wake, their focus has shifted away
from obtaining confessions towards a structured process of
interviewing that is viewed as more professional than past methods.
In those parts of the USA where we undertook our research, Miranda
was described by detectives as an obstacle to their work. In
particular, it was deemed to be a barrier to speaking to people and
gaining a confession—both of which were described as intrinsic
parts of the detective’s role. The lack of acceptance of Miranda
amongst these homicide detectives appears to have led them to
adopt numerous techniques and tactics to “dance around” Miranda
and circumvent suspects rights. Consequently, suspects, including
those who are already vulnerable, find themselves pitted against
detectives who use trickery, deception, and coercion to deny them
their fundamental rights. In the final section that follows, we consider
the implications of these working practices for justice.
V. CONCLUSION
This study contributes to a small but meaningful body of qualita-
147The UK police Code of Ethics lists honesty as one of nine policing principles
along with accountability, fairness, integrity, leadership, objectivity, openness,
respect and selflessness. The Code of Ethics aims to ensure the standards of polic-
ing are maintained and prevent misconduct: “The Code also has a preventative
role. It requires everyone in policing to prevent unprofessional conduct by question-
ing behaviour which falls below expected standards. Additionally, it supports report-
ing or taking action against such behaviour.” See College of Policing, Code of Eth-
ics. A Code of Practice for the Principles and Standards of Professional Behaviour
for the Policing Profession of England and Wales, (Jul. 2014), http://www.college.po
lice.uk/What-we-do/Ethics/Ethics-home/Documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf).
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tive research on the investigation of criminal homicide and, in
particular, the custodial interrogation process. Our unique contribu-
tion is a comparison of investigative practices in two common law
adversarial systems: the United Kingdom and the United States.
Both nations implemented legal reforms meant to reduce the likeli-
hood of coercive interrogation practices. In the United Kingdom,
legal reform came in the form of legislation (PACE), whereas in the
United States, legal reform was enacted by a U.S. Supreme Court’s
Miranda ruling. Our findings reveal that these two legal reforms have
had differential impacts in the UK and the USA.
The findings from this study contribute to a broader literature on
the difference between the law as written in formal legal documents
(including legislation and judicial decisions) and the “law in action”
as practiced by legal authorities working in the social world.148 Leo
refers to this difference as the “gap problem” and describes it as “the
gap in our knowledge between legal ideals and empirical realities.”149
He notes that this gap is particularly wide in the study of police
interrogation. Our goal in this study is to add to a growing collection
of studies on the nature of this gap, particularly since some of the
most influential scholarship on what happens during custodial inter-
rogations is now more than twenty years old.150 Furthermore, we of-
fer a unique twist to this body of research by providing study results
from the United Kingdom, another nation with a common law
adversarial legal system that has implemented legal reforms associ-
ated with interview and interrogation practices. Our study of inter-
rogation practices in the United Kingdom provides a potent source
of comparison for current practices in the United States. Indeed,
some of the differences between the two nations (such as the routine
use of deception by U.S. detectives during interrogation) are
dramatic. Numerous commentators have suggested the need for
major revisions to Miranda, whether through judicial decision-making
or legislation. The findings from our comparison between the USA
and the UK offer some useful insights about what might be possible
as we think about the current reality and possible future reform of
Miranda.
The need for procedural reform in police interview and interroga-
tion practices is controversial, with some commentators arguing that
Miranda has tied the hands of police and made it much more difficult
for them to solve cases and bring offenders to justice. For instance,
148Jean-Louis Halperin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal
Change, 64 ME. L. REV. 45 (2011); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
149Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 36, at 266.
150See generally Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 36, passim;
Leo, Miranda’s Revenge, supra note 36, passim.
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according to Cassell and Fowles “strong empirical evidence sup-
ports the conclusion that Miranda’s unprecedented restrictions on
law enforcement has allowed numerous criminals to escape
justice.”151 Many others use research findings similar to ours as a
basis for suggesting the need for major reforms that strengthen
Miranda’s protections of suspects’ rights. For instance, Klein argues
that “the Miranda warnings have perverse results and ought to be
retired and replaced.”152 Alschuler argues that Miranda is a failure on
four dimensions: doctrinally, ethically, jurisprudentially, and
empirically.153 Regardless of one’s perspective on Miranda, two pat-
terns appear evident from the empirical evidence on custodial inter-
rogation practices. First, consistent with findings from the U.S. agen-
cies we studied, “dancing around Miranda” appears to be routine
practice in criminal investigations. Indeed, learning how to dance
around Miranda skillfully seems to be an important rite of passage in
the process of becoming a skilled detective in the USA. Second, the
potential remedies available for ameliorating Miranda violations are
largely toothless.154
The U.S. Supreme Court issues decisions by which the police
must abide, but the “gap problem” discussed earlier means there is
often a significant gulf between the law on the books and the law in
action. Police organizations and those who lead them must enact
policies and practices that are consistent with binding judicial rulings.
However, these policies and practices are not self-implementing and
sometimes do not match the letter or spirit of the legal authority that
motivated them in the first place. Zalman and Smith found that U.S.
police administrators were generally supportive of Miranda rules and
disagreed with the use of interrogation practices that deliberately
flout those rules.155 At the same time, three-quarters did not agree
with the notion that “aggressive psychological interrogation causes
false confessions.”156 Moreover, the respondents noted that officers
are rarely disciplined for Miranda violations.
Our findings beg the question—why do U.S. detectives dance
151Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of
Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforce-
ment, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685, 848 (2017).
152Susan R. Klein, Transparency and Truth in Custodial Interrogations and
Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2017).
153Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849, 890
(2017).
154Alschuler, supra note 153, at 890; Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998).
155Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police Executives Towards
Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873 (007).
156Zalman & Smith, supra note 155, at 873, 918–20.
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around Miranda so routinely, but UK detectives appear much less
likely to circumvent PACE? One obvious possibility that we will
consider in more detail shortly is simply that PACE is a more effec-
tive legal reform than Miranda for controlling the use of deceptive or
coercive interrogation. But other possibilities exist. One potential
explanation may simply be that there are strong cultural differences
between these two nations, including differences in legal culture,
police culture, and/or civic culture. With regard to police, compara-
tive research in the USA and the UK has identified an interesting mix
of differences and similarities.157 For instance, a historical study of
police in both nations revealed that police in London derived their
authority primarily from the institution, whereas police authority in
New York City derived primarily from the individual.158 Exploring
cultural differences between the USA and the UK is beyond the
scope of this article, but such differences may constitute one
explanation for the different responses to legal reforms that we have
outlined.
Another potential explanation may be differences in the availability
of alternative means of closing cases, including both forensic
evidence and other types of evidence. To the extent that alternative
forms of evidence may be more available to detectives in the UK,
there may be less pressure to secure confessions. For instance, if
detectives in the UK have greater (or faster) access to DNA or other
types of testing than detectives in the USA, then they may be able
to rely less on confessions and more on other sources of evidence
in making cases. We are not aware of any comparative research
evidence on the extent to which police in the UK have greater ac-
cess to DNA tests than police in the USA. However, it is clear that
police in the United States often face difficulty in securing DNA
analyses for evidence they have collected from crime scenes.159 This
point is particularly salient in sexual assault cases, in which forensic
evidence was not submitted for testing in thousands of cases across
the nation.160 The UK also has much greater CCTV coverage than in
the USA, and detectives often use this evidence to identify suspects
and witnesses. Testing the validity of these explanations is beyond
157MICHAEL BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY (1964); DAVID H. BAYLEY, PAT-
TERNS OF POLICING: A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (1985); WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS
AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND LONDON, 1830–1870 (1977).
158Miller, supra note 157, at 22–23.
159David A. Schroeder & Michael D. White, Exploring the Use of DNA Evidence
in Homicide Investigations: Implications for Detective Work and Case Clearance, 12
POLICE Q. 319 (2009).
160William H. Wells, Some Considerations When Making Decisions About
Prioritizing Sexual Assault Kits for Forensic Testing, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y. 585
(2016).
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the scope of this paper, but the issues we have identified are worthy
candidates for systematic empirical research.
Another potential explanation is differences between nations in
the number of violent incidents. The UK has a much lower homicide
rate than the USA and therefore its detectives may simply have
lower caseloads.161 If this is true, UK detectives may be able to
invest much more time and resources in solving each case. This is
an important theme in the empirical literature on homicide
investigations. For instance, in their study of why homicide clear-
ance rates decreased in Trinidad and Tobago, Maguire and col-
leagues reported that investigators performed well when homicide
rates were low, but “once the number of homicides began to increase
sharply, the existing organizational structures and processes became
overwhelmed.”162 The findings from our analysis are useful for
comparing investigative processes in the UK and the USA, but are
less useful for providing causal explanations for the differences we
observed. Such explanations would require a very different research
design than the one used here.
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the patterns we have
observed in this study has to do with differences in the structure and
content of the legal reforms implemented in both nations. Unlike
PACE, Miranda is a judicial decision, not legislation. Moreover, a
series of post-Miranda decisions has weakened its provisions. Weis-
selberg quotes a police training video that reveals how police are
being taught to exploit the gaps in Miranda’s protections:
When you violate Miranda, you’re not violating the Constitution. Miranda
is not in the Constitution. It’s a court-created decision that affects the
admissibility of testimonial evidence and that’s all it is. So you don’t
violate any law. There’s no law says you can’t question people “outside
Miranda.” You don’t violate the Constitution. The Constitution doesn’t
say you have to do that. It’s a court decision. So all you’re violating is
a court decision controlling admissibility of evidence. So you’re not do-
ing anything unlawful, you’re not doing anything illegal, you’re not
violating anybody’s civil rights, you’re doing nothing improper[.]163
Based on these types of guidance, police appear to be engaging
in deliberate strategies to circumvent Miranda. Research shows that
the majority of Miranda waivers “are not made knowingly, voluntarily,
161Fiona Brookman, Edward R. Maguire, & Mike Maguire, What Factors Influ-
ence Whether Homicide Cases are Solved? Insights from Qualitative Research
With Detectives in Great Britain and the United States, 23 HOMICIDE STUD. 145,
160–61 (2019).
162Edward R. Maguire, William R. King, Devon Johnson, & Charles M. Katz,
Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean, 20 POLIC-
ING & SOC’Y 373, 394–95 (2010).
163Weisselberg, supra note 154, at 191.
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and intelligently as required by Miranda.”164 Moreover, the most
vulnerable suspects, especially those with cognitive impairments,
are the least able to understand their rights under Miranda and
therefore the most likely to sign a waiver that imperils them.
Therefore the use of these strategies has clear implications for
procedural and distributive justice.
In contrast, PACE is legislation, not a judicial decision. There is no
evidence of its provisions having been successively watered down in
a series of court decisions. Moreover, it is built on a more credible
scientific foundation than Miranda. A meta-analysis on the impact of
interview and interrogation methods on true and false confessions
provides significant support for the model of interviewing required
under PACE. The study revealed that accusatorial methods (like
those used in the United States) “significantly increase the likelihood
of obtaining a false confession from an innocent participant.”165 In
contrast, information-gathering methods (like those used in the UK
under PACE) “elicit a greater proportion of true confessions, while
significantly reducing the likelihood of false confessions.”166 While
Miranda is now beset by “layers of exceptions, loopholes and by-
ways created by case law,”167 PACE appears to be based on a much
clearer and firmer foundation for regulating police behavior. Miranda
rests on a much shakier and more ambiguous foundation, both
legally and scientifically, which may be the reason why homicide
detectives are so routinely dancing around Miranda.
164Domanico et al., supra note 28, at 22.
165Christian A. Meissner, Allison D. Redlich, Sujeeta Bhatt, & Susan Brandon,
Interview and Interrogation Methods and Their Effects on True and False Confes-
sions, THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION (Jul. 2010), https://www.campbellcollaboration.org/
media/k2/attachments/Meissner_Interview_Interrogation_Review.pdf.
166Meissner et al., supra note 165, at 31.
167Meissner et al., supra note 165, at 31.
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